Actions/CI — schema + workflow dialect (S41a)

The Actions/CI subsystem is shipping in eight sub-sprints (S41a through S41h, plus optional S41i Nix engine). This doc covers what S41a lays down: the SQL schema, the workflow YAML dialect, the expression evaluator, and the load-bearing taint contract every later sub-sprint depends on.

S41a is parser + schema only — no triggers, no runner, no UI. The goal is to land a frozen contract that S41b/c/d/e can build against without churning under them.

SQL schema

Actions migrations currently span 0042–0051, 0053, 0057, 0060, and 0064–0066. Migration 0052 belongs to the repo source-remotes feature, 0054 belongs to push event protocol tracking, 0055 belongs to the social feed, 0056 belongs to user profile contribution settings, 0058 belongs to repo name reuse, and 0059 belongs to GitHub org imports.

#	Table	Purpose
0042	workflow_runs	One row per triggered workflow execution
0043	workflow_jobs	Jobs within a run (one row per jobs.<key>)
0044	workflow_steps	Steps within a job (one row per steps[i])
0045	workflow_secrets	Per-repo + per-org encrypted secrets
0046	workflow_runners	Registered runners + runner_tokens
0047	workflow_step_log_chunks	Hot-path append log buffer (concatenated to blob on finalize)
0048	workflow_artifacts	Per-run artifact metadata (90-day default expiry)
0049	actions_variables	Non-secret per-repo/org config (Forgejo parity)
0050	workflow_steps.step_with	Parsed with: inputs for magic uses: aliases
0051	workflow_runs.trigger_event_id	Trigger idempotency for retries/admin replays
0053	runner_jwt_used	Single-use replay gate for runner job JWTs
0057	workflow_job_secret_masks	Encrypted claim-time log mask snapshots per job
0060	Actions retention indexes	Narrow cleanup indexes for terminal steps/runs
0066	actions_*_policies, workflow_run_approvals	Enablement, runner-pool caps, and approval decisions

A few load-bearing choices, called out so they're easy to spot in a later schema diff:

• workflow_runs.run_index — per-repo monotonic counter. Each repo gets #1, #2, … so URLs like /{owner}/{repo}/actions/runs/42 are stable and human-friendly. Crib from Forgejo's actions_run.index.
• workflow_runs.version — optimistic-lock counter. Mutators bump-and-check rather than SELECT … FOR UPDATE. Required for S41g's race between a cancel request and a state transition.
• workflow_runs.concurrency_group — the concurrency-slot key, resolved at trigger time from the workflow's concurrency.group: expression. S41g's slot manager keys off this column and runner claim blocks younger runs while an older same-group run still has a queued/running job without cancel_requested=true.
• workflow_runs.parent_run_id — for re-runs. The new run references the original; the UI shows a "re-ran from #N" link.
• workflow_jobs.runner_id — FK added in 0046 (after the runners table exists). Nullable until claimed.
• workflow_steps has a CHECK constraint enforcing (run_command IS NOT NULL) <> (uses_alias IS NOT NULL) — exactly one of run: or uses:. The uses_alias column is further CHECK-constrained to the three magic aliases we accept in v1.
• workflow_secrets owns its value as bytea ChaCha20Poly1305- sealed via internal/auth/secretbox. Key derivation uses cfg.Auth.TOTPKeyB64 (already an operator-managed root) + (owner, kind, name) salt so re-keying is per-row.
• workflow_step_log_chunks.chunk is capped at 512 KB per row. The runner sends bigger payloads in pieces. (step_id, seq) is UNIQUE so duplicate sends are idempotent.
• actions_variables — non-secret, plaintext, scoped exactly like secrets (per-repo or per-org, never both on the same row). Forgejo has the same split; we mirror it for parity.
• runner_jwt_used — primary-keyed by JWT jti. Job endpoints insert into this table during auth; zero inserted rows means replay and the API returns 401. JWTs are HMAC-SHA256 and use an HKDF subkey derived from auth.totp_key_b64 with label actions-runner-jwt-v1.
• workflow_job_secret_masks — one encrypted JSON array of exact secret values per claimed job. It snapshots the log scrub set at claim time, preventing a rotated or deleted secret from disappearing from server-side masking while the old value is still in a runner's job payload.
• actions_site_policy, actions_org_policies, actions_repo_policies — inherited Actions enablement and abuse caps. Runner claim and trigger enqueue both read the effective policy: repo override, then org override, then site default.
• workflow_run_approvals — one approval-decision row for every run whose workflow_runs.need_approval flag is set. Approval records the maintainer and lets runner heartbeats claim the existing queued jobs; rejection completes the run with action_required.

The version and run_index patterns are the two pieces I'd point out to a future maintainer first. Both are cheap to add now and miserable to retrofit later.

Workflow YAML dialect (v1)

We accept a strict subset of GitHub Actions YAML. The parser rejects unknown keys at parse time so workflow authors find their typos immediately instead of shipping a workflow that does nothing.

Top level

name: my-pipeline                         # optional human name
on: [push, pull_request]                  # or full-form (see below)
permissions: read-all                     # default if omitted
env: { GREETING: "hello" }                # workflow-level env
concurrency:                              # optional slot manager
  group: ${{ shithub.ref }}
  cancel-in-progress: true
jobs:
  <key>:                                  # 1+ entries
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    needs: [other-key]                    # optional dep edge
    if: ${{ shithub.actor == 'alice' }}   # optional gate
    timeout-minutes: 60                   # 1..4320, default 360
    permissions: { contents: read }       # narrow workflow perms
    env: { K: v }                         # job overlay
    steps:
      - name: ...
        id: ...
        if: ...
        run: echo hi                      # run XOR uses
        uses: actions/checkout@v4         # exactly one of three aliases
        working-directory: ...
        env: { ... }
        continue-on-error: false

Triggers (on:)

v1 supports four triggers — anything else is a parse error.

Trigger	Surface
push	branches:, tags:, paths: (include + !exclude semantics)
pull_request	types: (opened/synchronize/reopened/...), branches:, paths:
schedule	one or more - cron: <5-field-expr>
workflow_dispatch	inputs: map (string/boolean/choice/environment)

uses: allowlist

Exactly three aliases are reserved at parse time, no exceptions:

Alias	Parser status	Runner status
actions/checkout@v4	accepted	executable with scoped checkout token
shithub/upload-artifact@v1	accepted	rejected until artifact upload lands
shithub/download-artifact@v1	accepted	rejected until artifact download lands

Any other uses: value (community actions, Docker images, composite actions) is an Error-severity diagnostic. The marketplace problem is explicitly out of scope for v1; revisit only if a real demand exists and we have an answer for supply-chain trust.

The current Docker executor runs actions/checkout@v4 and run: steps. Checkout happens on the runner host before a containerized step mounts the workspace. The server issues a short-lived checkout-purpose JWT scoped to the claimed repository and running job; the smart-HTTP handler accepts it only for read-only git-upload-pack. Artifact transfer remains explicit follow-up work, and the artifact aliases fail deliberately until that path exists.

Checkout v1 accepts only with.fetch-depth. The default is a depth-1 fetch of the workflow run's head_sha; fetch-depth: 0 requests full history. Submodules, LFS, path, persisted credentials, and marketplace actions are rejected because they are not part of this dialect yet.

File-size + parser caps

• 64 KB workflow file size cap (workflow.MaxWorkflowFileBytes). Files larger than this are rejected before YAML decode begins — defends against pathological inputs and gives operators a predictable upper bound on parser memory.
• 100 anchors per document (workflow.MaxYAMLAliases) — the billion-laughs guard. yaml.v3 doesn't expose a direct knob; we count alias nodes during a tree walk and bail.

${{ github.* }} alias

The dialect is intentionally rebranded to ${{ shithub.* }}. Authors who paste GHA workflows in unmodified will see their ${{ github.* }} references continue to work because the evaluator rewrites path[0] from github to shithub at the top of evalRef before taint computation, dispatch, and error rendering.

The alias is intentionally scope-narrow: only fields that exist in our shithub.* namespace (run_id, sha, ref, actor, event) route through. GHA fields we don't expose in v1 — event_name, repository, run_number, workspace, etc. — error with the canonical unknown shithub field "X" message. Slightly confusing for a GHA-flavored author but keeps the v1 namespace surface tight.

The alias preserves the load-bearing taint flag: github.event.X taints exactly like shithub.event.X. TestEval_GithubAliasIsTainted pins this contract.

Migration to strict-compat (drop the alias entirely) later is a one-PR flip; moving the other direction is much harder.

This is a deliberate decision recorded in the campaign plan.

Expression evaluator

${{ … }} expressions are parsed into a tiny AST and evaluated by internal/actions/expr. The surface is intentionally minimal:

Allowed namespaces

Namespace	Source	Tainted?
secrets.X	workflow_secrets	no, but sensitive
vars.X	actions_variables	no (operator-controlled)
env.X	workflow file	no (workflow author's text)
shithub.run_id	dispatch context	no
shithub.sha	dispatch context	no
shithub.ref	dispatch context	no
shithub.actor	dispatch context	no (resolved username)
shithub.event.*	trigger payload	yes — always

runner.*, steps.*, needs.*, matrix.*, inputs.* are all parse-time errors. They're parked for v2 and the parser's allowlist-closed posture means a future PR can't widen this accidentally without a clearly visible diff.

Allowed functions

contains(haystack, needle), startsWith(s, prefix), endsWith(s, suffix), plus the four job-status predicates success(), failure(), cancelled(), always(). That's the whole list. fromJSON, hashFiles, toJSON, format, and friends are explicitly rejected — they each carry footgun risk (parser DoS, FS access, side-channel injection) that we don't want to take on in v1.

Missing-value semantics

Reference	Missing → ?
secrets.NOT_BOUND	error (loud — workflow won't run)
vars.MISSING	empty string (GHA parity)
env.MISSING	empty string (GHA parity)
shithub.event.deeply.missing	null but still tainted

The "missing event path → null but tainted" case is a defence-in- depth choice: even if the path doesn't resolve, the result still came from the event payload, and we'd rather over-flag than under.

Taint contract — the load-bearing piece

This is the contract every later sub-sprint hangs off. Get it wrong and we have an injection-shaped hole in the runner.

Where the flag lives

The taint flag lives on expr.Value (the evaluator-produced value), not workflow.Value (the parser-produced value). Two different structs share the name Value because they live in different packages, but they have different jobs:

• workflow.Value carries the raw source string the parser read out of the YAML (an env entry, a with: input, a concurrency group expression). At parse time we don't know what the ${{ … }} body will resolve to, so there's nothing to taint yet.
• expr.Value is what the evaluator returns when it resolves a reference at runtime. This struct carries Tainted bool. The runner's exec layer (S41d) consumes that flag.

Pre-L5 the parser-side struct also had a Tainted bool field plus a Tainted() constructor — both unused, both confusing because they suggested two sources of truth. Dropped in S41a-L5 cleanup.

Propagation

Every expr.Value carries a Tainted bool. Set true iff the value transitively depends on shithub.event.*. Operators control secrets, vars, env, the rest of shithub.*. Authors control the workflow file. Only the event payload is attacker-controlled: a PR title, a commit message, a branch name from a fork. Those values must never be interpolated into a shell string.

Propagation rules:

• Reading shithub.event.X → Tainted: true (always, including missing-path null results).
• Reading secrets.X → Sensitive: true. Secrets are operator- controlled, so they are not tainted, but they must not appear in shell source strings or Docker argv.
• Reading any other namespace → Tainted: false and Sensitive: false, except env.X preserves both flags of the resolved env value. This closes the escape where an event-derived or secret-derived value is first assigned to env and then interpolated through ${{ env.X }}.
• Binary op (==, !=, &&, ||) → tainted or sensitive if either operand is.
• Unary op (!) → tainted/sensitive iff its operand is.
• Function call (contains, startsWith, endsWith) → tainted or sensitive if any argument is.

The runner consumes Tainted and Sensitive and refuses to interpolate either class into shell strings. Instead, those values are bound to runner-owned SHITHUB_INPUT_xx envvars and the shell source only references those placeholders. The author writes:

- run: echo "PR title was: ${{ shithub.event.pull_request.title }}"

The runner sees a tainted reference; it compiles the step to:

SHITHUB_INPUT_0="$user_pr_title" exec sh -c 'echo "PR title was: $SHITHUB_INPUT_0"'

…where $user_pr_title is set via Go's cmd.Env, never inserted into the shell source string or Docker CLI argv. Backticks, $(), ;, && — none of those work as command-injection vectors when the value reaches the shell as environment data instead of syntax.

The shared renderer lives in internal/runner/exec, so future engines consume the same injection boundary instead of reimplementing it. The runner claim payload includes workflow_runs.event_payload; without that field, the runner cannot evaluate and taint ${{ shithub.event.* }} references.

Tests for this contract live in internal/actions/expr/eval_test.go, internal/runner/exec/render_test.go, and internal/runner/engine/docker_test.go. Do not weaken them in a later PR without an audit-checkpoint review — they're explicitly load-bearing for S41e's threat model.

Runner log chunks pass through internal/runner/scrub before they are posted to the API. It masks exact secret values and preserves enough tail bytes between chunks to catch a secret split across chunk boundaries. S41e wires resolved workflow secrets into the runner claim payload and mask set, snapshots that mask set encrypted on the job, then applies the same exact-value scrub again in the runner API before persisting chunks. The server path also carries a possible secret-prefix tail from the prior persisted chunk, so a runner that bypasses client-side scrubbing cannot leak a secret by splitting it across adjacent log POSTs.

shithub.event payload schema (v1)

The event payload is the most user-facing part of the contract: once authors write workflows that template against shithub.event.X, schema changes are breaking. The v1 schema is pinned and labelled v1. Any addition is fine; renames and removals require a major bump.

The schema is enforced by typed constructors in the internal/actions/event package — one per trigger. S41b's pipeline calls these to build payloads; the function signatures pin the field set so adding a key requires editing the constructor in a visible diff. This is the same closed-door discipline as the expression evaluator's namespace allowlist.

Trigger	Constructor	Top-level keys
push	event.Push	ref, before, after, head_commit{message,id,author}
pull_request	event.PullRequest	action, number, pull_request{title,head{ref,sha},base{ref,sha},user{login}}
schedule	event.Schedule	(empty map — cron fired; cron expression is on the workflow_runs row)
workflow_dispatch	event.WorkflowDispatch	inputs{<name>: <stringified>}

Anything not in this table doesn't exist in v1. Accessing it returns null+tainted (the missing-path semantics above).

Adding a field: edit the constructor in internal/actions/event/, add a row to this doc, and update the corresponding *_FlowsThroughEvaluator test in event_test.go so the new path is exercised end-to-end. Reviewer-required note in the commit message — same standard as a new evaluator function.

Renaming or removing: that's a v1→v2 break. Don't.

Operator surface

shithubd admin actions parse <file> reads a workflow off disk, runs the parser, and dumps diagnostics + a canonical JSON rendering of the parsed AST. Useful for:

• debugging "why is my workflow not picking up changes" reports
• validating a workflow file before committing it
• producing a stable AST snapshot for inclusion in bug reports

Exit codes:

Code	Meaning
0	clean parse, no Error-severity diagnostics
1	file unreadable, oversized, or YAML malformed
2	parse produced Error-severity diagnostics

Other admin surfaces are scoped to later sub-sprints:

• S41c: shithubd admin runner register --name <foo> issues a registration token + writes a row to workflow_runners.
• S41g: POST /api/v1/jobs/{id}/cancel and the repository run-detail UI request cancellation. Running jobs flip cancel_requested; queued jobs are made terminal immediately.
• S41g: POST /api/v1/runs/{id}/rerun and the repository run-detail UI re-run completed/cancelled runs. Re-runs read the workflow YAML from the original run's head_sha, create a fresh queued workflow_runs row, and set parent_run_id to the source run.
• S41g: workflow-level concurrency.group is resolved at enqueue time against the trigger context (shithub.ref, shithub.sha, and shithub.event.*). With cancel-in-progress: true, enqueue requests cancellation for older active runs in the same group. Without it, runner claim leaves the younger run queued until the older run no longer has uncancelled queued/running jobs.
• S41g: workflow:cleanup is a daily retention worker enqueued by shithubd-cron.service. Operators can run it manually with shithubd admin run-job workflow:cleanup.

Workflow concurrency (S41g)

concurrency.group is a workflow-level slot key. The parser stores the raw value, and internal/actions/concurrency evaluates ${{ ... }} fragments when the run is enqueued. The trigger-time context deliberately does not include secrets; event-derived values may be tainted but are safe here because the value is only used as a database key.

When a run enters a non-empty group:

• cancel-in-progress: false leaves the new run queued behind older same-repo, same-group runs while those older runs still have queued/running jobs with cancel_requested=false.
• cancel-in-progress: true requests cancellation on those older jobs. Queued jobs become terminal immediately; running jobs keep running with cancel_requested=true so the runner can kill the active container. Once every active older job is cancel-requested, the group is released for the newer run.

The runner claim query enforces the queueing rule, not the web handler or UI. This keeps heartbeat races honest: multiple runners can poll at the same time, but only jobs whose dependency and concurrency blockers are clear can be claimed.

Runner timeouts (S41g)

jobs.<key>.timeout-minutes is enforced by shithubd-runner as a whole-job deadline. The parser stores the value in workflow_jobs.timeout_minutes with the GitHub-compatible default of 360 minutes and a 1..4320 cap.

When the deadline expires, the Docker engine explicitly kills the active step container, emits a terminal step update with status=completed and conclusion=timed_out, and the runner reports the job itself as completed/timed_out. The server rolls the parent workflow run up to timed_out when all jobs are terminal. A timed-out step is not masked by continue-on-error; the job deadline always wins.

The runner API increments shithub_actions_step_timeouts_total the first time a step reaches conclusion=timed_out. Duplicate terminal step-status retries do not increment the counter again.

Retention cleanup (S41g)

workflow:cleanup applies the durable Actions retention contract in this order:

1. Delete hot workflow_step_log_chunks for steps completed more than 7 days ago. Finalized logs already live in object storage.
2. Delete expired workflow_artifacts rows after deleting their actions/runs/... blob objects. The row's expires_at value is authoritative so per-upload retention overrides keep working.
3. Delete unpinned terminal workflow_runs older than 365 days. Child jobs, steps, artifacts, and consumed JWT rows cascade through FK ownership.
4. Delete consumed runner_jwt_used rows whose JWT expiry is more than 30 days old. This preserves replay/audit evidence for recent jobs without letting the replay table grow forever.

The defaults can be overridden in the worker payload:

{"step_log_chunk_days":7,"run_days":365,"jwt_used_days":30,"artifact_batch":1000}

artifact_batch caps each object-delete page and may not exceed 10000. Negative values are poison-job errors. The worker exports shithub_actions_runs_pruned_total{kind} where kind is one of chunks, blobs, runs, or jwt_used.

Production object storage also needs provider-side lifecycle on the same prefix: deploy/spaces/actions-lifecycle.json expires actions/runs/ objects after 90 days and aborts stale multipart uploads after 2 days. Apply it with deploy/cutover/apply-actions-lifecycle.sh.

Trigger pipeline (S41b)

Three layers between a triggering event and a queued workflow_run:

caller (push_process / pulls.Create / pr_jobs.PRSynchronize / dispatch HTTP)
    │
    └─► worker.Enqueue(KindWorkflowTrigger, JobPayload)
            │
            └─► trigger.Handler picks up:
                  Discover .shithub/workflows/*.yml at HEAD SHA
                  Parse each (skip + log on Error diagnostics)
                  Match each against trigger.Event
                  Enqueue each match
                        │
                        └─► trigger.Enqueue (one tx):
                              INSERT workflow_runs (ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING)
                              INSERT workflow_jobs per parsed job
                              INSERT workflow_steps per parsed step
                              (commit)
                              checks.Create per job (post-tx, idempotent
                                via ExternalID 'workflow_run:<id>:job:<key>')

Idempotency on the triggering event

The robust pattern, not a UNIQUE on (repo_id, head_sha). Each caller constructs a stable trigger_event_id from its triggering event's identity:

Caller	trigger_event_id format
push_process	push:<push_event_id>
pulls.Create	pr_opened:<pr_id>:<head_sha>
pr_jobs.PRSynchronize	pr_synchronize:<pr_id>:<head_sha>
dispatch HTTP	dispatch:<file>:<sha>:<8-byte-random-hex>
schedule sweep (S41b-2)	schedule:<workflow_id>:<window_start_unix>

Migration 0051 adds workflow_runs.trigger_event_id (text NOT NULL DEFAULT '') with a partial UNIQUE on (repo_id, workflow_file, trigger_event_id) WHERE trigger_event_id <> ''. The trigger handler does INSERT … ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING so:

• Worker retries (the same push_process replay) → no duplicate runs.
• Admin replays via shithubd admin run-job workflow:trigger ... → no duplicate runs.
• Re-runs explicitly construct a NEW trigger_event_id (rerun:<original_run_id>:<request_uuid>) and chain back via parent_run_id. History is preserved, no collision.

Each caller's collision-free namespace is short-lived and human-debuggable: a Postgres operator can grep workflow_runs.trigger_event_id to see exactly which triggering event produced a given run.

Filter evaluation

trigger.Match(workflow, event) is a pure function (no I/O, no DB). For each event kind:

• push: branch vs tag classified from the ref; only the matching filter list applies (a branches: filter rejects tag pushes and vice versa). paths: (when set) requires at least one changed path to match. Empty filter = match-all.
• pull_request: types: defaults to [opened, synchronize, reopened] when omitted (GHA parity). branches: applies to the base ref. paths: as for push.
• schedule: requires the workflow to declare the cron expression that fired. The sweep is the source of truth for which cron fires; we just gate on declaration. Avoids interpreting cron semantics in two places.
• workflow_dispatch: matches whenever the workflow declares on.workflow_dispatch.

Glob semantics in branches:/tags:/paths:: minimatch subset with * (single segment), ** (any), /** end-anchor (optional trailing path), **/ start-anchor, and !exclude (last-match-wins, exclusion-only list implies include-all).

Collaborator gate

Per the S41b spec's "external-PR support is parked" decision: PR triggers (both opened and synchronize) only fire when the PR's author is the repo's owning user. Conservative — drops legitimate non-owner collaborators in the org-repo case. Expanding the gate requires plumbing policy.Can into the worker context, which we defer to S41g where the lifecycle work touches that surface anyway.

Operator surface

• POST /{owner}/{repo}/actions/workflows/{file}/dispatches Body: {"ref": "...", "inputs": {"key": "value"}} (both optional; ref defaults to the repo's default branch). Returns 204 No Content on success. Synchronous trigger.Enqueue (no discovery — file is named in the URL). Auth: requires repo write.
• GET /{owner}/{repo}/actions.atom Returns the last 50 workflow runs as an Atom feed. Auth and visibility match the Actions tab (repo:read). Entries link to /{owner}/{repo}/actions/runs/{run_index} and include the workflow name/path, event, branch, short SHA, status, and conclusion.

Webhook events (S41h)

Actions emits webhook-facing domain events through notif.EmitTx on state transitions:

• workflow_run, with payload.action set to queued, running, or completed (completed may carry conclusion:"cancelled").
• workflow_job, with payload.action set to queued, running, completed, or cancelled.

Payloads are structural snapshots only. They include ids, run index, workflow path/name, head SHA/ref, event kind, status, conclusion, timestamps, job key/name/runner id, needs, timeout, and cancellation state. They deliberately exclude workflow_runs.event_payload, env, permissions, logs, runner JWTs, and secret values. This keeps the webhook surface stable without turning arbitrary workflow input into subscriber-facing data.

What S41b deliberately doesn't do

• Run jobs. S41c adds runner claim/status APIs; S41d adds the actual shithubd-runner execution binary.
• Schedule sweep. Cron-driven triggers split into S41b-2 to keep this PR reviewable; the trigger pipeline accepts schedule events, but no caller produces them yet. S41b-2 adds the sweep + the robfig/cron/v3 dep + shithubd-cron.service wiring.
• External-PR triggers. Conservative collaborator gate above.

Secrets + variables settings surface (S41c)

S41c wires the previously schema-only workflow_secrets and actions_variables tables into repo/org settings.

Repository routes are gated through policy.ActionRepoSettingsActions (repo:settings:actions, admin role minimum):

• GET /{owner}/{repo}/settings/secrets/actions
• POST /{owner}/{repo}/settings/secrets/actions
• POST /{owner}/{repo}/settings/secrets/actions/{name}/delete
• GET /{owner}/{repo}/settings/variables/actions
• POST /{owner}/{repo}/settings/variables/actions
• POST /{owner}/{repo}/settings/variables/actions/{name}/delete

Organization routes follow the existing org-settings prefix and are owner-only:

• GET /organizations/{org}/settings/secrets/actions
• POST /organizations/{org}/settings/secrets/actions
• POST /organizations/{org}/settings/secrets/actions/{name}/delete
• GET /organizations/{org}/settings/variables/actions
• POST /organizations/{org}/settings/variables/actions
• POST /organizations/{org}/settings/variables/actions/{name}/delete

Secrets are sealed through internal/auth/secretbox using the operator-managed Auth.TOTPKeyB64 root key. Secret list pages render names/metadata only; the plaintext value is accepted once on create or rotation and never rendered back. Variables are non-secret plaintext configuration, so settings pages render their values. Both stores use the same name grammar as the database constraints: ^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$, 1-100 characters. Variables additionally enforce the 4096-character value cap in Go before hitting the DB constraint.

What S41a deliberately doesn't do

• No trigger pipeline. domain_events aren't matched against on: yet — that's S41b.
• No runner. S41c/S41d add runner claim APIs and the execution binary.
• No UI. The Actions tab still renders the placeholder — S41f.
• No secret encryption helpers wired to anything writable — S41c.
• No JWT issuance, no runner registration flow — S41c.
• No log streaming, no SSE — S41d/f.
• No execution sandbox, no scrubbing, no injection guards enforced at the runner — S41d/e (the parser-side taint contract is the foundation those depend on, not a substitute).

Why these choices, in two paragraphs

The schema work is front-loaded so later sub-sprints don't ripple a migration through every PR. version (optimistic locking) and run_index (per-repo monotonic) are the two columns I'd flag to a new maintainer immediately — both are nearly free to add up front and painful to retrofit. The split between hot-path log chunks (Postgres) and finalized blob (Spaces) is shaped after Forgejo's log path; we pick the boring well-trodden answer over the clever one because log throughput is the failure mode that bites first.

The taint contract is the security-load-bearing piece. Every later sub-sprint trusts that the Tainted flag is set correctly here, in the parser/evaluator, and never re-derived downstream. The narrow allowlist of namespaces and functions exists exactly so a future PR that adds, say, fromJSON has to do it knowingly — by widening the allowlist in a visible diff, with a reviewer-required note, rather than by accident. The ${{ github.* }} alias is a pragmatic concession to copy-paste users; the rebrand to ${{ shithub.* }} is the canonical form so future divergence isn't awkward.

See also

• internal/actions/workflow/parse.go — the parser
• internal/actions/expr/eval.go — the evaluator
• internal/migrationsfs/migrations/0042..0049_*.sql — the schema
• tests/fixtures/workflows/*.yml — canonical input shapes
• internal/actions/workflow/parse_test.go — fixture-driven tests
• internal/actions/expr/eval_test.go — taint-contract tests
• .refs/forgejo/services/actions/ — reference architecture
• Campaign plan in conversation memory (humble-cooking-bunny)